non serviam #16
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Contents:    Editor's Word
             John A. Marmysz: A Prolegomena
                To Any Future Nihilistic Philosophy


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Editor's Word
_____________

  One of the most amusing books I have ever read is Kant's Metaphysics of
Morals. Here Kant bases his moral teaching on one of his famous
transcendental arguments; IF morality is not to be meaningless, then its laws
must be necessary and universal, and IF a law is necessary and universal,
then its base must be deontological. Many believe this argument shows that
morality's truth is thereby proven; proven from the absolute truth of
deontology. I[*], on the other hand, find it amusing to see what  pains
people go to, IF they regard moral concepts as absolute. Morality,  I say,
is meaningless other than as personal and artistic expression.
  This issue main features an article taking issue with Kant's program of
reification, "A Prolegomena To Any Future Nihilistic Philosophy". Its
author, John Marmysz, is a philosopher with interests in logic, ethics
and social philosophy. He is a member of the North American Nietzsche
Society and the Society for the Philosophic Study of Contemporary Visual
Arts. His interests reflect in his work as a movie theatre manager at
the Clay Theatre in San Francisco and a teacher of logic at the Santa Rosa
Junior and Menlo colleges.
  This issue's article is a consequence of his interest in "the social
ramifications (both positive and negative) of a 'nihilistic point of
view' as explored by Nietzsche and many anarchist thinkers."

  Now, as an update for our old readers, there are now two Egoist /
Stirnerite Web pages on the Net. Their URLs are

        http://pierce.ee.washington.edu/~davisd/egoist/

and

        http://www.math.uio.no/~solan/stirner.html

They contain much of the same material, but are far from identical. If you
should feel like contributing any material to these sites, you are very
welcome. Contact davisd@u.washington.edu or solan@math.uio.no


Svein Olav

[*] We say "I", as We want to refrain from using the Royal "We".
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John A. Marmysz:

        A Prolegomena To Any Future Nihilistic Philosophy


 Years ago, I got into an argument with a woman over the merits of an ethics
based upon rational principles versus the merits of an ethics based upon
personal preference. She was a Kantian; I was a nihilist. There didn't seem
to be any common ground for us to share. Being younger and much less
aggressive in my technique of debate than she, I came away from the
interaction feeling like I was the loser. My suggestions were dismissed by
this woman with a condescending laugh. She would then reassert her own points
like they were established facts, gesturing in the air as if to illustrate
the "common sense" she spoke.

  Well, years have passed and woe be it to that woman if our paths ever cross
again. You see, my philosophic self confidence has strengthened over time and
now, in retrospect, I recognize the flaws, errors and sophistries utilized by
rationalists in general, but which were especially prominent in the arguments
of the Kantian in question. Allow me then to draw the battle lines and replay
the incident the way it would occur today, showing the full force of the
nihilistic viewpoint and the weakness of the opposition. Far from committing
the "straw man" error, I will simply show that the rationalists "Kant"
provide satisfactory rebuttals to the nihilistic critique.

  Kant placed a great deal of emphasis on morality's rational properties.
According to his view, anyone, by an exercise of reason, can deduce the
principles and rules that govern correct moral action. Using a kind of
naturalistic argument, he concluded that reason, like an organ, must exist
for a purpose, and that purpose is to deduce moral imperatives. To live
morally is to live in accordance with that imperative deducible by "pure"
reason alone - namely the "Categorical Imperative"; the "Golden Rule" by a
different name. For Kant, morality possessed a distinct form that could be
"summarized" into an overarching principle and the basis for moral action
lay in adherence to this principle.

  Now, the alert nihilist will pull in the reigns. "Whoah, Kantian! Can
we slow down and talk about 'reason' for a minute?" Kant and his
overzealous advocates cavalierly assert that humans are essentially "rational
beings", as if "reason" is some sort of tangible thing that  can be
 identified by pointing at it. But it is difficult to see the similarity
between an organ and "reason". Furthermore, there are some organs, like the
appendix or tonsils, which serve no real purpose and which we can do quite
fine without. My first mistake when arguing with "Ms. Kantian" was to indulge
her and not challenge her exercise in the reification of "reason".

  But even if I did allow her this step, can't many things - including
incompatible conclusions - be reasoned? Take for example arguments for the
existence of God. Suppose someone had the audacity to propose that since God
is a perfect being, and since perfection implies existence, God must exist.
This argument is perfectly "reasonable". It moves quite logically from its
premises to its conclusion. An equally "reasonable" competitor, however,
might argue that if an all powerful and wholly "good" God existed, he
wouldn't allow "evil" in the world. There is evil in the world.  Therefore an
all powerful and wholly "good" God does not exist. Case closed...at least
until the next "reasonable" argument from the other side is voiced. If there
is a God, he certainly works in mysterious (not reasonable) ways.

  Everyone's got reasons, and everyone reasons, but the existence of a
faculty called "reason" does not follow from any of this.  Rather than a
thing or a faculty, it may be more accurate to talk about the process of
"reasoning".  When we speak about reason, it seems that what we are really
talking about is the process of offering reasons in support of a belief,
point of view, or conclusion.  Reasoning involves the process of
argumentation, and arguments can be convincing in two major ways: (1) they
can appeal to rationality or (2) they can appeal to intuition. The arguments
of a logician illustrate the rational end of the scale. His exercises in the
formulae of allowable inference are nearly devoid of content, representing
rational, formal relationships between variables. At the opposite end of the
scale - the intuitive end - are the "arguments" of the TV telethon host. His
ability to convince is based almost totally on formless content. He cries and
puts his arms around crippled children, counting on the persuasive power of
emotion, accessed by intuition, to trigger an empathic response in others.
Somewhere in between these extremes paces the trial lawyer who mixes appeals
to rational legalism with emotional appeals to justice and fair play.

  The skilled formulation of convincing, rational arguments is learned by
devoting much time, effort and many resources to academic studies. It is
through this scholarly process of legitimation that one earns the privilege
to be taken seriously in the activity of convincing others rationally.
Because of the time, effort and resources involved in "earning degrees", a
minority of the individuals in a population will pursue this course. The
obstacles emplaced are sufficient to deter most people from completing (or
even attempting) a program of academic study. The result is that the skill of
rational argument, and the privilege that accompanies it, will be
concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of individuals.

  The power to convince through appeals to intuition, on the other hand, is
not granted only to those who are trained formally. When a person appeals to
intuition, he does so on the assumption that others share his intuition and
that this shared knowledge is sufficient evidence for further statements. For
the purposes of persuasion, humans often appeal to specific emotions,
accessed by intuition, in order to activate empathic responses in others,
thereby "moving" (convincing) them. It is because humans share a similar
range of emotional responses that such a tactic seems to work. In any
case, the ability to move others emotionally is present in all members of the
species to some degree or another (...even mentally defective humans have the
power to provoke empathy, though whether they are responsive to the same
effects is an open question). The appeal to intuition/emotion, then, is a
much more democratic tool than the appeal to rationality.

  Whether an appeal leans more towards rationality or more towards
intuition, it is being made on behalf of something, and the person making the
appeal is attempting to convince others of that something. The arguer's
conclusion, in this case, is just that belief which the arguer believes to be
true and which he wishes others to accept as well.  If asked to justify this
belief, the arguer may provide his reasons for belief or he may simply assert
the belief as "intuitively" true.

    The individual who argues for a moral belief attempts to justify an
"ought" on the basis of what he feels "is" the case. For instance, I may say
"I feel that it is wrong to torture children with cattle prods, so you ought
not to torture children with cattle prods", thereby making a prescriptive,
moral statement by way of a descriptive one. Arguing for a moral belief
entails working towards the imperative from the indicative; from what "is" to
what "ought" to be. The move from "is" to "ought" makes the "is" necessary by
universalizing it and creating a statement with imperative, or action
directing, force. A moral statement, then, is dependent upon a statement of
(perceived) fact.  But this perceived fact (or premise or reason or what have
you) is subject to acceptance or rejection as well, and if not accepted as
intuitively true by a listener, the arguer may be called upon to support his
belief in that "fact" with further reasons.  This process of reason giving
(or reasoning) will go on indefinitely until the arguer and listener arrive
at commonly held beliefs that they both accept as intuitively true (or until
they agree to disagree).  Moral arguments are an especially  clear case in
which the acceptance or rejection of a conclusion is less dependent upon the
reasons given for that conclusion than on the acceptance or rejection of
certain "moral intuitions" about what is in fact true or false about the
world.

     Now, a Kantian would have us believe that the process of moral reasoning
proceeds in a straight-forward, deductive, rational fashion.  A person
concerned with a moral question, according to the Kantian, is capable of
deriving his conclusion from one of the formulations of the "Categorical
Imperative".  Any act that is immoral will undermine the Categorical
Imperative and involve that person in a logical contradiction.  For instance,
when a Kantian asks, "Is it wrong to torture children with cattle prods?",
 his answer might proceed something like this:  "The Categorical Imperative
states that one should act only in a manner such that an action can be willed
as a universal rule for all of mankind.  So, what if everyone tortured
children with cattle prods?  Well, I was once a child.  If I was tortured
with a cattle prod I would feel a lot of physical and emotional pain.  Since
pain is something that I wish to avoid, I cannot possibly will the torturing
of children as a universal rule, since it would entail willing something for
myself that I do not will for myself.  I would, in effect, be involved in a
contradiction. Case closed."  This all seems very "reasonable", but as has
already been pointed out, so are many other things.  A masochist might reason
quite differently and become involved in no contradiction whatsoever.

     But further than this, the Kantian has taken for granted what is really
at issue.  From where does this "Categorical Imperative" originate, and why
should we accept it as a guiding principle? The Categorical Imperative sounds
strangely similar to one of those intuitions that you either share or don't
share with someone.  To say that it springs from "pure" reason is like
telling non believers "You are just not thinking hard enough!", when in fact
it is, perhaps, the Kantian who is not thinking hard enough about what
motivates his desire to make universal moral statements in the first place.

  The purpose of any moral judgement is to compel certain human behaviors and
to constrain others, so all moralities are, in effect, coercive. The argument
involved in justifying an intuition is meant to convince others that it is
proper to act in accordance with that intuition, so limiting the number of
allowable actions that may be pursued. The move from "is" to "ought", then,
seems motivated by the desire to control other people's actions. In any moral
debate, a few people try to get a lot of other people to constrain their
actions.

  There is a tremendous power imbalance in our society. A relatively
small group of people possess the power to influence the vast majority of
people by way of controlling the legitimate definitions of correct action.
Those few who are allowed to participate in the battle of competing moral
arguments are the ones who are entitled to define the permissible realm of
actions in the population. Those trained and skilled in the use of
rationality are the ones granted access to the moral battlefield, while those
not so trained are locked out of the arena. Since the ability to use appeals
to rationality can be concentrated in the hands of the few, training in
rationality is an expedient method to assure that not everyone will be
allowed to have their voices heard over the din of combat. It is one of the
ways that an unequal power balance is maintained. To put it simply, rational
arguments are considered legitimate because only a few people have the
ability to skilfully formulate them, while intuitive appeals are
delegitimated because many people can convincingly utilize them.

  It should be stressed that there is nothing inherent in rationality
that makes it more coercive than intuition when used in argument.  The point
is simply that the privilege of rationality over intuition is a convenient
method by which to assure that the many will act in accordance with the
wishes of the few. Since both rational and intuitive appeals ultimately rest
on premises arrived at intuitively, the privilege of rational arguments over
intuitive ones does not make the moral debate any less based in intuition.
This privilege does provide an arbitrary and controllable standard by which
to grant authority to one opinion over another. The desire to coerce is
exhibited in the desire to make moral statements. Rationality is simply an
effective way to make a small range of those moral statements legitimate.

  Nietzsche wrote, "The greatest danger that always hovered over humanity and
still hovers over it is the eruption of madness - which means the eruption of
arbitrariness in feeling, seeing and hearing, the enjoyment of the mind's
lack of discipline, the joy of human unreason." Why is the lack of
rationality seen as such a danger? Well, without the standard of rationality
(or some such controllable standard) to judge moral arguments by, an
effective means of social control disappears. If "anything is permitted",
then no one has the legitimacy to control anyone else. There is no "right" or
"wrong", only differing perspectives and preferences. This is a danger to
those who assert that there exist certain fixed, absolute, independent and
"naturally occurring" truths because it redistributes the definitional power
previously concentrated in their hands amongst the entire population. The
perspectival character of existence is such that no two interpretations of a
situation are equal, and all interpretations ultimately rest upon feeling,
emotion, intuition and non-rational, idiosyncratic responses. The implication
of this state of affairs is that no one perspective has ultimate authority
over any other. What follows for the moral debate is that the battlefield of
conflicting views is prone to be invaded by those who had previously been
judged "unfit for service". Such a change would allow for the dismantling
of social hierarchies, promoting a situation in which all members of the
species would share common freedom to act and explore the infinite
alternatives and possibilities open to them, giving us a fuller and richer
picture of what it is to be human.

  The creation of, and submission to, moral judgements is closely
associated with men's tendency to live socially. If social living depends
upon the few coercing the many, then the elimination of universalized moral
judgements might mean the collapse of society. But the fear that such an
eventuality inspires is not necessarily well founded. The only alternative to
an unequal relationship between the few and the many is not necessarily a
"war of one against all". There are those who see an alternative in voluntary
co-operation between individuals (the anarchy of Stirner, Proudhon, Bakunin
and more recently Bob Black), and those who value a kind of individualist,
non-intervention between humans (Nietzsche and many recent "Post-modern"
authors). The element of coercion may never be eliminated completely when it
comes to the area of human interaction (simply by asserting a preference to
someone, the seed of hierarchical ranking seems to be present), but by
eliminating the tendency towards universalizing intuitions, humans would be
less prone to restrict the available pool of perspectives on situations and
would in fact be more likely to expand this pool, resulting in a more diverse,
rich and full picture of the world.

  A professor I studied under once said to me that the more deeply one explores
what it means to be rational and logical, the less certain one becomes of how to
draw the definitional lines between the rational and non-rational domains. My
reasonable, Kantian opponent might perhaps still be unconvinced by my brief
monologue, but I would hope that one thing is very clear. Without a clear
definition of reason and rationality, the rationalists are fighting a losing
battle against us mighty nihilists. The nihilistic perspective offers a
coherent and, if you insist, "reasonable" account of the emergence and use of
morality as a social control device. It offers a damaging critique of
rationalism in general, but also promises to expand and deepen our
understanding of the world and of humanity.

...But of course, that's just my perspective.
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*                                                                     *
*        "I do not want to wage war against what is ugly.             *
*         I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to              *
*         accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be              *
*         my only negation."                                          *
*                                  -Nietzsche, Gay Science            *
*                                                                     *
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