Program In Comparative International Development Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA Working Paper #1 LATIN AMERICAN URBANIZATION IN THE YEARS OF THE CRISIS Alejandro Portes The purpose of this article is to review recent trends in the process of urbanization as it has taken place in major Latin American cities. An abundant literature on Third World urbanization during the 1960s and 1970s painted a fairly coherent picture of that process. That image, generally accepted in both academic and policy circles, serves as the backdrop against which contemporary trends will be evaluated. In Latin America, in particular, the population was becoming rapidly urbanized but the process was said to be distorted, in a number of ways, by the common condition of underdevelopment in which these countries found themselves. First, the movement of the rural population toward cities did not occur in a gradual and even manner, but as an accelerating influx directed toward a few receiving centers. In most countries, a single city was simultaneously the political capital, the place of residence of the dominant classes, and the preferred site for industry. Primacy -- the condition where the population of the largest city is larger than those of the next three put together -- was not new to Latin American countries. What the migrant flows of the mid- twentieth century did was to accelerate this disparity. Gigantic heads of dwarfish bodies dominated the landscape of the region; projections to the twenty- first century anticipated more of the same (Beyer, 1967; Breese, 1966). Second, within the large cities themselves, growth combined with a highly unequal income distribution to produce other distortions. The advent of the automobile allowed the wealthy to escape the peasant crowds by moving toward remote suburban locations; their political power compelled city governments to extend infrastructural services to these areas. At the opposite end, increasing rents and housing scarcity drove the poor to create their own shelter solutions in irregular settlements. The latter were also situated in remote peripheral locations. The outcome of these centrifugal forces was growing spatial polarization and low population densities, which increased costs and reduced the quality of urban services (Hardoy, Basaldua, and Moreno, 1968; Amato, 1968; Portes and Walton, 1976: Ch. 2). The disintegration of traditional agriculture in the countryside of most nations took place without the creation of sufficient labor absorptive capacity either in the new modernized farms or in urban industry. The first scarcity was the source of migration itself, the second led to the growth of a vast "marginal mass" in the cities which survived by inventing employment in the fringes of the urban economy (Nun, 1969; Singer, 1977; Garc¡a, 1982). Unemployment was low in Latin American cities because the poor could not afford not to work in the absence of welfare protection. Instead the typical profile of major Latin cities featured low rates of unemployment together with high rates of casual or informal employment which often represented half or more of the total labor force (Tokman, 1982; PREALC, 1982; Portes and Benton, 1984). Regardless of the label applied to it, irregular work was seen, by many, as a countercyclical mechanism: it expanded in times of recession in order to absorb those expelled from modern employment, but was expected to contract with economic growth (Lagos and Tokman, 1983; Marshall, 1987). Together, accelerating primacy, spatial polarization of the classes, and high informal employment comprised central features of Latin American urbanization prior to the 1980's. The literature which described these features also provided a coherent account of their causes. In Latin America, the process of import-substitution industrialization had been taken over by subsidiaries of multinational corporations which not only displaced domestic producers, but also workers since their superior technology was capital intensive. A similar type of technology, applied to agriculture, also displaced labor from the countryside. Idle rural laborers headed for the one or two centers where opportunities for industrial employment existed, but where they confronted the difficult conditions imposed by foreign-led industrialization (Mangin, 1967; Nelson, 1969; Leeds, 1969; Cornelius, 1971). The similarity of these conditions, which repeated themselves with monotonous regularity from one to another of major Latin American cities, supported the view that it was not idiosyncratic domestic variables, but common subordination to external constraints which was the central factor shaping the urbanization process in the region. Within this theoretical context, the following analysis attempts to provide preliminary answers to two questions. First, the extent to which Latin American urbanization during the last decade has continued to reflect each of the features described above. Second, to the extent that changes in the process have taken place whether they are common across the region -- reflecting directly its subordinate, but changing position in the world economy -- or whether they can be attributed more appropriately to different national idiosyncratic factors. Latin America in the 1980's The historical context of this analysis is the region-wide economic crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s which led to dramatic reversals in previous patterns of growth and which forced a series of socially painful adjustments. It is this drastic change of course which leads to the question of how other basic aspects of the fabric of Latin American societies, including urbanization, have been affected. Although the origins and effects of the 1980s economic downturn are by now a familiar tale, a summary of these developments is necessary in order to place the following narrative in perspective. With ups-and-downs along the way, Latin American economies managed to grow steadily in the post-World War II years. The regional gross product, which in 1950 had stood at 51.8 billion dollars, reached 190.9 billion in 1980. Without exception, individual countries more than doubled their national products, although rates of growth were much higher in such countries as Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil. Signs of the impending crisis began to appear, however, during the 1970s. Oil prices tripled in early 1974, leading to economic slowdown and then to decline in the major market economies. In most Latin American countries, the recourse of choice was massive foreign borrowing which provided economic breathing space and made possible sustained growth. Acceptance of massive petrodollar loans became the norm, while hopes were expressed that an upward turn in terms of trade would help retire the debt in the near future (Alzamora and Iglesias, 1983; Iglesias, 1984). These expectations were not met, however, and instead the new oil shock of the early 1980s led to a still sharper downturn, this time without the cushion of foreign borrowing. The Latin American terms of trade declined from 131.4 in 1974 to 94.3 ten years later. By 1985, they were only 4 percent higher than what they had been at the time of the Great Depression (Massad, 1986: 18-19). Inability to meet loan payments forced one country after another to implement re- adjustment policies which effects were profoundly recessionary. The overall goal was to improve the balance of trade by generating an exportable surplus. The price to be paid, however, was negative growth rates for the first time in fifty years. Between 1981-84, the Latin American per capita product declined by 9 percent, the worst performance since 1930 but including figures which, like those for Venezuela (16%), El Salvador (22%), and Bolivia (25%) reached truly catastrophic levels. By 1987, the regional figures looked somewhat better, primarily because of improved conditions in Brazil and Colombia, but the economic decline continued in most other countries. In 1980, Latin America was already a continent of urban dwellers with up to 40 percent of national populations concentrating in major urban centers. Cities thus had to experience directly the effects of debt-induced crisis. The question is whether such effects reinforced urban primacy, class polarization, and other features described in the research literature of past decades or whether they took the process of urbanization in a different direction. A related question is whether the process continues to reflect the uniform condition of Latin American societies as part of the capitalist periphery or whether divergent national patterns of development have taken place. A Note on Method Investigating the above questions with the data at hand is a daunting task. The difficulty is that existing statistical series are incomplete or seldom go beyond 1980. In addition, there are inconsistencies in figures reported by different international organizations and problems of comparability across countries. For example, statistics on unemployment may not reflect true cross-national differences, but differences in ways of posing the question by census- takers and in the reach of their enumerations. In these circumstances, it would be rash indeed to submit the data to complex statistical procedures in order to test precise hypotheses. The best that can be attempted is to piece together disparate pieces of information in order to arrive at a picture of likely trends. That picture must necessarily be regarded as tentative. Aggregate time series are useful to help determine "breaks" or reversals in certain aspects of urbanization which can then be related to the timing of major political or economic events. However, because of their many limitations, time series data for Latin America as a whole were supplemented by an in-depth study of specific cities. Lacking time and resources to investigate all possible sites, we concentrated on three major urban centers: Bogot , Montevideo, and Santiago -- capitals of Colombia, Uruguay, and Chile, respectively. Information on each of these cities comes from extensive reports prepared as part of the collaborative project described in footnote 1. Reasons for selecting these cities are both practical and methodological. First, although major urban centers, they are still of manageable size, permitting an in-depth probe into various features of their development. Second, given the need to limit such probes to a few cities, it is desirable to focus on contrasting rather than similar cases. The simple comparative logic underlying this preference is that processes of continuity or change occurring across widely different national settings allows us to draw more general inferences than those taking place within a narrower range. For example, a massive drop in wages registered in these three capitals is more suggestive of a broader trend than if it had been observed exclusively in Andean cities or in those of the Southern Cone.2 Differences between the respective national experiences are generally well-known, but it is necessary to summarize them as a backdrop for the ensuing analysis. Chile and Uruguay are both countries of relatively early industrialization and urbanization in the Latin American context. In both countries, but especially Uruguay, the rise of an urban proletariat was accompanied by a relatively well-developed social welfare system and protective labor legislation. Urban growth in both countries concentrated in the capital city, leading to high levels of urban primacy (Klaczko and Rial, 1981; Lombardi and Altezor, 1981; Necochea, 1986; Rodriguez, 1987). Colombia, on the other hand, is more typical of patterns of industrial development, aggregate urbanization, and labor market regulation in the rest of the continent. The Colombian urban system is unique, however, in its absence of the accentuated primacy found elsewhere. Despite this notable difference, urban growth in Bogot  during the two decades prior to 1980 accelerated, leading to the expectation of convergence with the typical Latin American primate-city syndrome (Amato, 1968; Murillo and Ungar, 1977; Portes and Walton, 1976: Ch. 2). Apart from these structural differences and others to be noted below, the three countries also diverged in the political system and state political philosophy predominant during the last decade. In Chile, neo- conservative policies were implemented by the military government which came to power in the wake of the 1973 coup. Although by the mid-1980s the most extreme versions of monetarism had been jettisoned by the Pinochet regime, market-oriented policies continued to be applied with unusual rigor (Foxley, 1983; Valenzuela, 1984; Ffrench-Davis and Raczynski, 1987). In Uruguay, similar adjustments were attempted by the military government which came to power in the mid- 1970s. In this instance, however, neo-conservative policies were resisted by vast sectors of society with organizational experience garnered during the democratic period. The demise of these policies was followed shortly by the return to power of an elected government (Gonzalez, 1983; Notaro, 1984; CINVE, 1984). In Colombia, the bi-partisan consensus which sustained the institutions of a restricted democracy did not disappear during the 1970s nor did it break under the pressures of the subsequent crisis. Political continuity ran parallel to an eclectic approach to economic management which avoided the doctrinaire excesses found elsewhere. As a result, the hyper-inflation and near defaults experienced by other Latin American countries were avoided. Adjustment to the externally-induced economic downturn of the early 1980s took place in Colombia within the framework of established institutions rather than, as in Chile, as a drastic departure from them (Bagley, 1985; Gall¢n, 1986; Kalmanovitz, 1986; Ocampo, 1986). Differences between political systems and economic policies are important because they can alter, in decisive ways, the impact of external factors on the domestic social fabric. In terms of the research questions at hand, the issue is whether such differences are reflected in patterns of continuity or change in urban development. Before plunging into that inquiry, it is necessary to emphasize that results from the comparative analysis of the three cities, like those from aggregate time-series data, must be regarded as tentative. They are at best indicative of trends to be compared with those anticipated by the past research literature on the evolution of Latin American urbanization. Urban Primacy Perhaps the strongest image coming out of past writings on Third World cities is the concentration of the national population in one or at best two gigantic centers. The process, driven by high population growth and accelerating rural-urban migration, transformed the demographic profile of Latin American countries in the aftermath of World War II. Since the forces which underlined the movement -- agricultural unemployment and industrial concentration -- showed no signs of abating, primacy was assumed to continue indefinitely into the future. The late 1970s and 1980s witnessed the rapid growth of Latin American primate cities which reached extraordinary levels in some instances. With over 14 million people, Mexico City became the largest urban agglomeration in the world. Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires also surpassed the 10 million mark during the decade. Table 1 presents data which indicate that, without exception, primate cities continued to grow during the 1980s. Yet amidst this growth, there has been a deceleration, if not reversal in their relative expansion.3 As shown in the middle columns of table 1, twelve out of fourteen countries for which reasonably reliable data are available experienced declines in primacy. They include Argentina and Mexico, which capitals are among the three largest urban centers in the region. Although values of the primacy index must be regarded with caution, they indicate, at a minimum, that primacy rates have not expanded at the speed anticipated in the past. =================================================================== Table 1 Latin America: Largest Cities and Indices of Urban Primacy, 1970-85 Country Largest Size of Largest City Index of City 1970 1980-851 Urban Primacy (000s) (000s) 1970 1980-852 Argentina Buenos Aires 9,400 9968 (80) 4.03 3.91 Bolivia La Paz 500 881 (82) 1.40 1.07 Brazil Sao Paulo 8,405 10099 (85) .77 .77 Chile Santiago 2,600 4067 (85) 2.83 3.32 Colombia Bogot  2,500 4169 (83) .94 .93 Cuba La Habana 1,700 1983 (84) 2.48 2.38 Ecuador Guayaquil 800 1388 (84) 1.18 1.06 Haiti Port-au-Prince 400 738 (84) 4.12 4.07 Honduras Tegucigalpa 281 539 (85) 1.79 1.06 Mexico Mexico City 9,000 14750 (80) 3.10 2.84 Panama Panama City 350 608 (84) 3.96 -- Paraguay Asunci¢n 445 719 (82) 6.01 3.48 Peru Lima-Callao 2,500 5523 (85) 5.32 4.20 Uruguay Montevideo 1,350 1516 (85) 8.38 7.85 Venezuela Caracas 2,147 2944 (81) 1.81 1.51 1. Year of census or estimate in parentheses. 2. Computed as the ratio of the largest city's population to the sum of the next three largest cities. Sources: Kingsley Davis (1969:tables A and E) United Nations (1973-1985):tables 6 and 8) James N. Wilkie and Adam Perkal (1986:tables 645-650) World Bank (1983) ================================================================= The main exceptions to this pattern -- Chile and Colombia -- will be discussed below. In Brazil, the continuation of Sao Paulo's hegemony is due primarily to the relative decline of Rio de Janeiro which represented, until the 1970s, the second tier of the "dual primacy" pattern characteristic of that country (Hardoy, 1972a; Perlman, 1976; Portes and Walton, 1976: Ch. 2). Data presented in table 2 support this interpretation by showing that Sao Paulo actually held smaller percentages of the urban Brazilian populations in 1985 than fifteen years earlier. A similar pattern is found in Argentina, where Buenos Aires held lower proportions of the total and urban populations in 1980 than a decade before. The case of Mexico City is more representative of the overall regional trend. With some exceptions, this trend is toward greater concentration of the total population in the largest center along with lesser concentration of the urban population. In twelve out of fifteen countries for which data are available, the primate city contained declining shares of the urban population. The apparent implication of the trend is that, while the process of urbanization has continued unabated, it has been partially re-directed away from major cities and toward secondary centers.4 ================================================================= Table 2 Latin America: Evolution of the Urban Population Largest City/ Largest City/ Total Population Urban Population2 1970 1980-951 1970 1980-85 Argentina 39.6 34.1(83) 50.1 40.7 Bolivia 10.7 14.8 (82) 38.2 32.3 Brazil 8.9 7.4 (85) 15.8 10.4 Chile 27.7 33.8 (85) 36.4 40.6 Colombia 12.2 15.1 (83) 24.8 30.3 Cuba 19.9 19.9 (84) 33.1 28.1 Ecuador 11.5 15.2 (84) 30.2 29.9 Haiti 9.4 14.2 (84) 47.0 56.3 Honduras 11.2 12.3 (85) 36.1 30.9 Mexico 17.8 20.1 (80) 37.0 30.4 Panama 29.2 19.8 (84) 51.1 38.8 Paraguay 19.3 21.3 (82) 50.7 49.7 Peru 18.7 25.4 (85) 78.6 65.0 Uruguay 46.7 50.7 (84) 55.9 49.7 Venezuela 20.6 19.0 (81) 27.4 15.3 1. Year of census or estimate in parentheses. 2. Urban population defined as the total in cities over 100,000 and towns that possess urban characteristics. Sources: See table 1. ================================================================= Colombia and again Chile are major exceptions to this pattern. Since the two countries are among those selected for in-depth study, it is possible to take a closer look at their urban profile on the basis of data unavailable from international sources. Table 3 presents these results along with those for the third chosen country, Uruguay. In the Colombian case, growing concentration of the urban population in Bogot  has indeed taken place, but at a slowing pace. In the intercensal period 1964-73, the city increased its population at a brisk 6 percent per year, exceeding growth in mid-size cities by a total of almost 20 percent. The situation reversed itself during the next period when Bogot  grew only at 2.9 percent per year or 15 percent less than intermediate cities. As a result, official projections made during the 1970s and based on the assumption of expanding primacy over-estimated Bogot 's real population in 1985 by between 1.8 and 2.7 million (Cartier, 1988:39). The decline in population growth also coincided with a slowing down of the physical expansion of the urban perimeter. The average yearly growth of Bogot 's built area between 1977 and 1982 was 164.3 hectares or less than half what it had been during the preceding fifteen year period. Although the two processes do not necessarily go together, it is telling that population and spatial growth have declined simultaneously during the last decade. ------------------------------ table 3 about here ------------------------------ The available data for Santiago de Chile portray a similar pattern of decelerating growth. Between 1952 and 1982, the metropolitan area population increase dropped by about 1.5 percent per year. In this instance, the slowing down of primate growth was accompanied by a decline in the overall urbanization growth rate, which explains why Santiago's share of the urban population continued to increase. However, the deceleration of growth rates was more marked in the metropolitan area, especially when compared with the next four largest cities which maintained relatively constant rates. If the satellite port town of Valparaiso is excluded, the disadvantage of Santiago vis-…-vis growth rates in the next three largest cities become significant: the latter grew about 33 percent faster during the last intercensal period. If the trend continues, it is likely that Chile will follow other Latin American countries in experiencing declining rates of primacy in the future. Finally, the Uruguayan case follows a parallel trend, where the capital has grown recently at a fraction of the next four largest cities and of the entire urban system. Urban growth during the late 1960s and early 1970s was very slow everywhere, but especially in Montevideo, due to the strong negative effect of international migration (Lombardi and Altezor, 1986). Growth resumed during the intercensal period, but it was much slower in the capital than in other cities. As a result, Uruguay -- by far the most "primate" of Latin American countries -- has started to move gradually toward a more balanced urban system. In conclusion, patterns of urban growth throughout the continent have departed significantly from earlier characterizations and their projections into the future. Urbanization of the population and its concentration in primate cities have continued, but the latter process represents, in many instances, a declining fraction of the former. Secondary urban centers, including mid-size cities, have taken the lead in urban expansion in a number of nations. Trends in the three countries for which detailed data are available support this conclusion, despite wide differences in their economic and political structure. Although it would be incorrect to read into these results the imminent demise of primacy in Latin America, they indicate the need to revise views held until recently as uncontroversial. Class Polarization Along with primacy, a central element in past descriptions of Latin American cities is the physical separation of the classes. The movement of both elite and working masses away from the urban core led to relatively low levels of population density in many cities.5 As with primacy, spatial polarization was assumed to increase indefinitely since the forces which sustained it -- rural-urban migration and transport innovations allowing the poor and the well-to-do to settle in remote locations -- were expected to continue (Hardoy, Basaldua, and Moreno, 1968; Unikel, 1972; Portes and Walton, 1976: Ch. 2). A first approach to establishing whether polarization has increased is to look at the question indirectly through the evolution of population densities. To the extent that greater numbers of people move to distant locations, densities in central city areas would be expected to remain stagnant or decline. Table 4 presents the available data for selected cities, defined according to local administrative limits. Although the latter vary widely and thus affect how urban populations are counted, the pattern produced by these figures is consistent. With the exception of Buenos Aires, densities have continued to increase in urban centers, regardless of their juridical definitions. ------------------------------ table 4 about here ------------------------------ By themselves, however, these results do not provide compelling evidence against polarization because they say little about the actual distribution of social classes in space. To investigate the question, there is no other recourse than to look at specific urban sites. Changes in the distribution of the population in the three cities selected for in- depth study provide valuable lessons in this respect. Bogot  has been mentioned often as the prototypical example of Third World urban polarization. The north of the city is the preserve of the well-to- do, featuring neighborhoods which like Antiguo Country, El Chic¢, and El Lago have little to envy the best residential areas of North American cities. Shopping centers like Unicentro complete the illusion of finding oneself in a suburb of the developed world. The middle-classes occupy areas like Chapinero -- in- between the upper residential enclaves and the city center. Toward the south and southwest, there are established working-class neighborhoods and then the endless stretch of "pirate" subdivisions reaching toward the hills. The poor -- low-paid workers, informal artisans and vendors, and domestic servants -- live mostly there (Usandizaga and Havens, 1966; Amato, 1968; Mohan, 1980). The north-south axis in Bogot  has been, for many years, symbol and shorthand for the underlying class structure. During the 1970s, the rapidity with which the "frontier" of pirate settlements advanced in the southwest and the consolidation of the upper-class enclave to the north led to the expectation of a new qualitative gap. Poverty would be, once and for all, relegated to remote "satellite" towns from where it would be difficult to attempt even minimal participation in urban society. Patterns of change during the 1980's deviated significantly from this expectation. Along with increasing density (see table 4), there have been signs of a less sharp spatial separation of the classes. One such sign is the distribution of different levels of housing quality. The Bogot  Special District Planning Department distinguishes several such housing "strata" -- the lowest being typical of dwellings in new pirate subdivisions and the highest corresponding to the most exclusive residential neighborhoods. Maps portraying the location of these extreme strata as well as middle- income areas indicate a far more mixed distribution of socio-economic levels than what would have been anticipated on the basis of prior descriptions of the city's development (CENAC, 1987; Cartier, 1988).6 Exceptions to the pattern of class polarization documented by recent evidence have not occurred at random, but reflect the operation of three identifiable processes during the last decade. First, there has been a displacement of middle income groups toward Bogot 's south and southwest periphery. The movement followed the Autopista Sur towards the established working-class neighborhoods of Bosa and Soacha and around the area of Tunjuelito. Crossing the symbolic north-south demarcation line was prompted by the need of many middle-income groups to find affordable housing at a time of growing economic scarcity. Housing prices in established areas to the north remained high, especially in comparison with stagnant or declining real earnings. As a result, permits for formal residential construction in south and southwest areas like Primero de Mayo, Fontibon, Sur Oriente, and others --went from 4.5 percent of the city's annual total during the 1970s to 12.1 percent in 1981-82 and then to 19.6 percent in 1983-86 (Cartier, 1988:55). Second, working-class settlements also expanded in the north, advancing east from the Rio Bogot , especially around the barrio Tibabuyes in Suba and in the hill area above Usaqu‚n. Places of settlement near upper and middle class areas have always been prime locations for the poor since they afford greater opportunities for casual employment. During the 1980s, this attraction became all the stronger because of growing difficulties in finding or retaining regular jobs (see next section) and because of increasing transportation costs from remote working-class settlements (Carroll, 1980; Pineda, 1981; Stevenson, 1981; Cartier, 1988: 49-50). Third, greater socio-economic mix in the metropolitan area has been aided by the changing policy of the Bogot  District government toward pirate subdivisions. In the past, government policy consisted of ignoring the existence of these areas or attempting to eradicate them. Changes during the late 1970s and 1980s were prompted by the recognition that unregulated settlements represented effective solutions to the demand for popular housing. As a result, a rapidly increasing number of pirate settlements have been legalized and efforts have been made to extend the urban infrastructure toward them. The outcome has been to reverse the prior trend toward complete satellization of poverty (Murillo and Ungar, 1977; Alcald¡a Mayor, 1987a, 1987b). These recent trends have not erased class polarization which continues to be one of the main structural characteristics of the city. However, they indicate that the process has become less relentless and unilinear than in the past. Montevideo represents a different urban environment because of the level of development attained by the country earlier in the century and the absence of population pressures. Unlike other Latin American capitals, there is no "frontier" of illegal settlements advancing in any direction and the city itself presents a more stable and consolidated appearance than what is common in the region. Despite these differences, Montevideo also experienced a process of class polarization similar to those found elsewhere. Beginning in the 1940s, the elites and middle-classes left the city center for new residential locations toward the east. Their movement followed the River Plate along the beaches of Pocitos, Buceo, Malv¡n, and Carrasco. During the 1960s and 1970s, lower-income groups also moved away from central city areas, but in a different direction -- toward the north and northwest. Land prices and the affordability of housing were decisive in this movement; prices along the eastern shore exceeded U.S. $350 per square meter in the late 1970s and fluctuated between U.S. $50-100 in the center, while they were as low as U.S. $5-10 in the northwest periphery (Klaczko and Rial, 1981: Ch. 2; Lombardi and Veiga, 1988). This centrifugal movement went beyond the limits of the metropolitan region to encompass adjacent departments. Thus, in the intercensal period 1963-75, Canelones to the north increased its population by 13.1 percent at a time when the metropolitan area grew only by 1.5 percent. Consolidation of the upper-class enclave to the east, displacement of low-income groups to the north, and the rapid decay of the urban core gave to Montevideo in the 1970s a profile similar to other Latin American cities. As in Bogot , however, changes during the 1980s have led to a partial reversal of this trend. Growth of the metropolitan area during the last intercensal period, although slow, was four times what it had been in the prior one and, as seen in table 4, there was a sizable increase in average densities. More significant has been the distribution of different socio-economic levels inside the urban perimeter. Data on average housing quality as of the mid-1980s show that, along with clear evidence of polarization, there is a substantial presence of low- income groups in the urban center and in areas close to the most exclusive neighborhoods (Mazzei and Veiga, 1985; Lombardi and Veiga, 1985).7 This spatial mix has not emerged casually, but is the result of two convergent developments during the last decade. First, there has been an expansion of irregular settlements. In Montevideo, these settlements, known as cantegriles, do not form a ring around the regular city area, but are found as "pockets" interspersed within established neighborhoods. The margins of creeks crossing the city -- the Miguelete, Malvin, and Carrasco -- are common cantegril locations, often at close distance of upper- income areas. Irregular settlement growth during the 1970s and 1980s accompanied the general deterioration of living standards and the contraction of regular industrial employment (see next section). By 1985, approximately 9,000 families or about 50,000 people were living in these precarious settlements (Mazzei and Veiga, 1985:12). The figure includes the original cantegriles, as well as "emergency settlements" -- built by the government to eradicate the former but which experienced rapid decay in turn. Second, there has been a gradual return of the poor to central city areas. Unlike the open poverty of cantegriles, the situation of dwellers in tenements and rooming houses or conventillos in the urban core is concealed by conventional street fa‡ades. Conditions indoors can be every bit as dramatic, however, as those in the irregular settlements. For the poor, a central city location, no matter how precarious, has the familiar advantages of greater access to informal employment and lower transportation costs. Hence, the deterioration of central-city areas -- lamented by others -- is perceived by many low-income families as an opportunity to escape open poverty or confinement in remote locations. This preference explains the fierce resistance of central-city dwellers to forced removal to the suburbs during the military regime and, in more recent years, the growth of areas adjacent to the decaying urban center. Approximately 70,000 people or about 5 percent of the city's population were estimated to live in tenements and rooming houses in 1985 (Mazzei and Veiga, 1985; Benton, 1986; Lombardi and Veiga, 1988). In Santiago de Chile, upper and middle-income groups also decamped from the center and toward new residential locations in the post World War II period. Wealthier families moved east toward remote and secluded areas at the foot of the Andes -- the comunas of Providencia and Las Condes. Middle-class housing was predominant in ¥u¤oa and La Reina toward the southeast and also in eastern Providencia. South and west of the center were traditional areas of modest, but regular housing occupied by the established proletariat. Beyond them and covering more than half of the urban periphery stretched the frontier of irregular settlements -- the poblaciones (CORHABIT, 1966; Goldrich, 1970; Behrman, 1972). During the 1960s, the trend toward class polarization was alleviated by two countertrends. First, the concentration of offices and recreational facilities in the urban core, where members of different classes congregated during working hours; and second, the presence of large poblaciones in the east, often in close proximity to upper-income neighborhoods. The large hill settlements of La Faena and Pe¤alolen in ¥u¤oa were examples (Portes, 1971). Between 1970 and 1985, population densities increased significantly in the province of Santiago (see table 4), a pattern which would suggest additional reversals in the trend toward polarization. In reality, increasing density reflected rapid suburbanization and the decline of the old urban core. Free-market ideologues hired as advisors from U.S. universities persuaded the military authorities that urban land was not really a "scarce" resource and that limits on the free operation of the land market should be removed. As a result, 64,000 new hectares became available for suburban development, at a time when the actual built area of Santiago was only 39,000 hectares. The outcome was a qualitative leap in the pattern of spatial segregation of the classes, labelled by some Chilean scholars "class apartheid" (Necochea, 1986; Morales and Rojas, 1987; Raczynski, 1988: 45). The specific processes leading to this outcome were threefold. First, the emergence of luxurious commercial and recreational facilities in the eastern periphery and the migration of banks and office buildings there. This development made it possible for upper-income groups to work, shop, and play in the same pleasant environs without having to intermingle with the lower orders in the urban center. Second, the official program of eradication of precarious settlements removed close to 30,000 families from poblaciones and into new housing projects. Most of the eradicated came from areas adjoining upper and middle-income neighborhoods in the eastern sectors, which were effectively "cleansed" of their poor population. More importantly, the removal of limits to urban development allowed housing projects for the eradicated to be built in more distant locations than ever before -- five to fifteen kilometers away from the center. The time, expense, and difficulty of transportation from these remote areas effectively isolated its dwellers from the rest of the city (Morales and Rojas, 1987; Rodriguez, 1987; Chateau and Pozo, 1987). Third, a process of administrative decentralization was completed in the 1980s which increased the number of municipalities or comunas of metropolitan Santiago from 16 to 32 and transferred to them most of the local functions previously in the hands of the central government. The principal effect of this policy was to consolidate the juridical as well as spatial segregation of the classes. The eastern area, now cleansed of irregular settlements, was sub- divided into the comunas of Santiago, Providencia, Las Condes, ¥u¤oa, and La Reina. Housing projects for eradicated pobladores were located, in turn, in the poorer and more remote municipalities.8 Figure 1 illustrates the outcome of these policies by the mid-1980's. In Santiago at present, it is possible to delineate the approximate class composition of different areas on the basis of expenditures per capita of the respective municipalities. In 1984, the richest comuna -- Providencia -- spent $10,949 (U.S. $85.37) per inhabitant in public services; one of the poorest -- La Pintana -- spent $431 (U.S. $3.36) or 25 times less. Figure 1 indicates how this latter area, despite its extremely meager resources, has been one of the main recipients of the poor population removed from Santiago's eastern zone. In 1985, 53 percent of the population of La Pintana consisted of eradicated groups (Morales and Rojas, 1987: 109). ------------------------------ figure 1 about here ------------------------------ In synthesis, the pattern of spatial polarization of Latin American cities experienced significant changes during the years of the crisis, although they were not in a consistent direction. In cities like Bogot  and Montevideo, polarization of the classes continued to be the dominant theme, but it did not exclude exceptions and reversals. The latter did not come about primarily through deliberate policies, but as an unintended consequence of efforts of groups threatened by the economic downturn to find affordable housing or new sources of employment. Such efforts led to the displacement of middle-income groups toward formerly working-class areas and to the partial re- occupation by the poor of zones near upper-income suburbs or in the urban core.9 In Bogot  since the mid-1970s and in Montevideo since the inauguration of an elected government in the early 1980s, policies have been implemented to incorporate the poorest areas into urban society. In Santiago, efforts by the working-class to cope with the economic consequences of the crisis met, on the other hand, with resistance by the authorities. The latter effectively blocked the creation of new popular settlements, especially in areas near the well-to-do, and proceeded to dismantle those in existence. As a result, instead of a partial reversal of class polarization, there has been a qualitative leap in its development. The creation of class-homogenous municipalities gave juridical form to this process, accentuating the spatial separation between privileged classes and the poor. In this context, it is difficult to speak of a single city any longer, as groups thus segregated lead widely divergent lives and remain confined -- by choice or force -- to their distinct spatial locations. Unemployment and Informality The portrait of Latin American urbanization in the 1960s and early 1970s included a plausible explanation for the relatively low levels of unemployment in most cities. They were low not because jobs were plentiful, but because the poor had to find some income-earning activity even if it meant "invented" jobs of minimal productivity (Bairoch, 1973; Chaney, 1979). For the same reason, rates of underemployment or informal employment were high since they reflected the manifold economic activities of low-income groups. Following this argument, it would be reasonable to predict a significant expansion of labor market participation and the informal sector in the 1980s to compensate for the contraction of regular wage employment. The evidence supports this prediction only partially and offers a more mixed portrait of labor market adjustment. As seen in the first columns of table 5, there was a significant decline in industrial employment in most countries between 1970 and 1984, reflecting contraction of their formal sectors. With few exceptions, real minimum wages in cities -- which represent the ceiling of those commonly paid to unskilled labor -- remained stagnant or declined between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. However, neither labor market participation nor informal employment registered quantum leaps in response to these new conditions. The available data, presented in the next columns of table 5, indicate no significant increase in the size of the labor force and a significant, but not overwhelming increase in informal employment by the mid-1980s. According to estimates of the Regional Employment Program for Latin America (PREALC), this increase was about 20 percent for the region as a whole during the early 1980s. Non-voluntary underemployment -- another indicator of informality -- did not expand significantly in most countries for which information is available. In Argentina, for example, underemployment represented only 4.6 percent of the urban labor force in 1984, 2 percent lower than a decade before (ECLAC, 1986:25). Most significant was the rise of open urban unemployment which reached double-digits in most countries for the first time since reliable statistics have been available. The relevant series are presented in the last columns of table 5. For the region, as a whole, open unemployment increased from an unweighted average of about 6 percent of the urban economically active population (EAP) in 1974 to about 14 percent in 1984. In the latter year, urban unemployment was the highest ever recorded in Colombia, Peru, Honduras, and Venezuela (ECLAC, 1986:23). As noted previously, unemployment and underemployment are measured differently and thus comparisons across countries are not warranted. Still, the fact that unemployment rates -- however measured -- climbed significantly in country after country is indicative of a consistent regional trend. What this trend suggests is that increases in informal employment did not function as an effective countercyclical mechanism against the contraction of the modern sector. Instead, both informality and open unemployment grew together in most countries. As a result, masses of people found themselves without access even to the meager earnings drawn in the past from odd-jobbing, street vending, and other informal activities.10 ------------------------------ table 5 about here ------------------------------ The evolution of labor markets in Bogot , Montevideo, and Santiago de Chile helps clarify these trends. In Bogot , there has been sustained rises in labor market participation along with increasing levels of unemployment since the 1970s. As shown in table 6, the 10 percent increase in participation registered during the last decade was due exclusively to the growing labor offer of women. Open unemployment during the same period doubled, reaching a record 14 percent of the labor force in 1986. As the next columns of table 6 indicate, the data do not support the prediction of massive increases in informal employment which appears to have remained steady at about half of the urban labor force. The figures are in agreement with arguments of Colombian economists that adjustment to the crisis took the form of a decline of jobs in the formal sector and a decline of wages in the informal (Ayala, 1982; 1987). ------------------------------ table 6 about here ------------------------------ Additional support for this line of argument comes from data on the evolution of wages in Bogot , presented in table 7. As shown there, wages of regular salaried workers did not decline at all during the 1980s. On the other hand, earnings of the self- employed -- the best available proxy for informal employment in the series -- experienced significant variations. There was a consistent trend toward rising earnings for the self-employed until the late 1970s, followed by a rapid decline during the next five years; only in 1985 was there a partial recuperation. Further, more than half of all informally-employed workers in Bogot  earned less than the minimum-wage in 1984, as compared with only 3 percent of regular employees. If figures are percentaged across income categories, 92 percent of those earning less than the minimum wage were informally-employed, while 77 percent of those receiving double or more that amount were formal workers or employers (Lanzetta and Murillo, 1988: table 8). These figures again support the conclusion of a significant earnings disadvantage against workers in the informal sector. ------------------------------ table 7 about here ------------------------------ In Bogot , established firms responded to the crisis by laying off workers who could not find comparably paying jobs in a crowded informal sector. Without minimal incentive to enter irregular employment, many ex-formal employees opted to remain out of work. The expectation among these workers that their situation would be temporary is not warranted, however. In industry, contraction of regular employment has been accompanied by the proliferation of informal micro-enterprises to which production and services are now subcontracted (Lanzetta and Murillo, 1988; Cartier, 1988). As shown in the last column of table 6, industry is the one sector where informal employment has expanded rapidly in recent years; much of the labor employed by micro-enterprises is female and is paid below the legal minimum. To the extent that this adjustment strategy -- massive lay-offs of regular personnel combined with informal subcontracting -- continues, unemployed industrial workers have little chance of recuperating their lost jobs. Unlike Bogot , the informal economy expanded rapidly in Montevideo during the years of the crisis. Table 8 indicates that self-employment and underemployment increased by about one-third and that the informal sector as a whole employed 70 percent more people in 1985 than ten years earlier. A representative survey of 700 households in 1984 found that 31 percent of all employed individuals worked informally, either full or part-time, and that 41 percent of households had at least one wage-earner in the informal economy. Irregular full-time employment was more common among women (33%) and those with elementary schooling (25%) than among men (26%) and the university-educated (10%) (Fortuna and Prates, 1988). ------------------------------ table 8 about here ------------------------------ As in Bogot , the 1975-85 decade witnessed significant growth in labor market participation in Montevideo, attributable in its entirety to an increase in the labor offer of women. Informal enterprises working under contract for larger firms made heavy use of female workers as means to increase flexibility and reduce costs. In the leather export industry, for example, women represented over two-thirds of skilled homeworkers and sweatshop operators (Prates, 1983). Yet the expansion of informal employment proved insufficient to absorb those displaced from regular jobs plus new entrants in the labor market so that, as in Bogot , open unemployment reached record levels. By 1984, unemployment had more than doubled its historical average of about 6 percent during the post-World War II period. Since 1975, the downturn has affected both men and women -- unemployment growing by 3.4 percent among male workers and by 5.7 percent among females. The strategy of dismissing regular employees and decentralizing production activities to micro- enterprises and sweatshops has been as common in Montevideo as in Bogot  (Fortuna and Prates, 1988). In both cases, it has led to increases in industrial informal employment and to a rapid rise in open unemployment. As in Bogot , chances of dismissed industrial workers in Montevideo to recuperate their lost jobs are at present dim.11 The economic adjustment process led finally to declining wages and increasing income concentration. Table 9 presents data which indicate that average real wages of the lower nine-tenths of Montevideo's labor force were the same in 1984 as a decade before, having lost about one-third of their purchasing power since 1981. Earnings of the top one-tenth also declined, but not so steeply so that they still represented an 80 percent gain over the same ten-year period. As a result, income inequality -- traditionally low in Montevideo relative to the rest of Latin America -- began to approach the .50 Gini Index mark characteristic of other cities of the region. ------------------------------ table 9 about here ----------------------------- In Santiago, trends toward rising unemployment, declining real wages, and income concentration are all present, albeit in an exacerbated form. The data in table 10 also replicate the familiar evolution of informal employment in other cities. In this instance, however, informal sector growth does not appear to reflect so much the expansion of subcontracting by established industrial firms as a set of autonomous survival activities. The empirical literature on the Santiago labor market mentions few instances of productive decentralization. Instead, casual self- employment and other informal activities tend to concentrate in petty commerce and services (Hardy and Razetto, 1984:11-14). The last columns of table 10 provide an illustration of this trend. ------------------------------ table 10 about here ------------------------------ At the aggregate level, the process is reflected in a drop of industrial employment from 19 to 14 percent of the labor force between 1973 and 1984 and a parallel rise in the labor force employed in commerce and services -- from 42 to 51 percent (Arellano, 1987; Raczynski, 1988).12 The relative weakness of industrial subcontracting is probably a major factor behind the very high rates of unemployment registered during the 1980s. Open unemployment, rather than industrial decentralization, dominated the labor scene during the economic crisis. Since the 1970s, the government has attempted to ameliorate this situation by launching two emergency work programs. Levels of remuneration for those enrolled are, however, a fraction of the minimum wage and coverage was limited, in 1984, to approximately one-third of the unemployed (Hardy and Razetto, 1984; Shkolnick, 1986; Raczynski, 1987). Together, open unemployment and emergency employment represented 25 percent of the Santiago EAP in 1982 and 34 percent in 1983. These are very high figures, unparalleled since reliable statistics have been available. Unlike Bogot  and Montevideo, labor force participation did not increase in Santiago during the 1980s. This result, presented in the first column of table 10, must be attributed to the absence of minimal economic incentives in either formal or informal employment. Although there is some evidence that low-income women did attempt to compensate for loss of male earnings by offering their labor at any price, their efforts did not make a dent in the aggregate statistics (see Rosales, 1979; Raczynski, 1988). Along with mass unemployment, there was also a significant decline in earnings. Table 11 presents figures which illustrate the size of the loss. Real wages in Santiago in 1986 were 15 percent lower than fifteen years before. The official minimum wage lost 23 percent of its value during the same period. It is important to note that unlike Bogot , wage stagnation is not attributable in this instance to decentralization and the expansion of informal employment. Instead, declines in real wages in Santiago took place within the formal sector itself. Economic adjustment appears to have adopted, in this instance, the dual form of contraction of labor demand and wage compression among the remaining regular labor force. ------------------------------ table 11 about here ------------------------------ The outcome of these processes was widespread impoverishment among the working-class population. The third column of table 11 presents data which indicate that poor households in Santiago -- defined as those with incomes lower than twice the value of a basic food basket -- increased from 28 to 45 percent between 1970 and 1986. Indigent households alone -- those with incomes below one basic food basket -- rose from 8 to 19 percent (Pollack and Uthoff, 1986). Consequently, food expenditures, caloric and protein consumption dropped significantly among the poorer three-fifths of the metropolitan population.13 Finally, the last column of table 11 indicates a decline in real average household incomes in Santiago during the years of the crisis. Additional data (not shown) indicate that the loss was concentrated in the poorer 40 percent of the population. These figures are in line with preceding ones, showing that unemployment and the drop in real wages were not compensated by other income-earning activities among poorer households. As a result, household income inequality, high to begin with in 1970, increased during the 1980s. In synthesis, results presented in this section suggest that open unemployment can expand rapidly in Third World cities. The "cushion" which remunerative informal activities are supposed to provide in times of economic recession turns out to be more apparent than real. Informal employment may rise rapidly as a result of decentralization by large formal firms; the process does not necessarily create new jobs but merely transfers them from the protected to the unprotected sector. However, in the absence of such transfers, chances to find new jobs in times of recession become very limited and competition among newly-redundant workers drives earnings to unacceptably low levels. Hence, as several authors have noted, it is not the case that an expanding informal sector counterbalances a stagnant formal one, but rather that both expand and contract together. Before the economic crisis, low unemployment in most Latin American cities reflected the existence of remunerative opportunities in either growing modern industry or an expanding informal economy. During the process that started in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s, the contraction of formal employment was followed by declines in informal earnings due to the rapid rise of the labor supply available for informal enterprises and the parallel decline in demand for their goods and services (Capecchi, 1988; Ayala, 1987). The consequence has been widespread unemployment and impoverishment of the urban working-class, reaching its extreme case in Santiago de Chile. Discussion Having examined patterns of change in several aspects of urbanization, the next question is what are the theoretical implications of these findings. Primacy, class polarization, unemployment and informal employment certainly do not exhaust all that there is to urban development. Yet, their joint evolution offers evidence that "something" has changed in the Latin American city during the last decade. While preliminary, these findings should caution against continuing describing Latin American urbanization in terms commonly accepted in the past. Most questionable in the light of these results are accounts of a process of "dependent" distorted urban development common to the entire region. Distortions certainly there are, but they are not the same everywhere. In evaluating the interplay of external and domestic forces which underlies each of the trends discussed above, it might be well to begin with those which seem to reflect most closely the operation of external inducements and constraints. In the process, we may also consider the possible "reversibility" of the observed trends. Deceleration of primacy and the rapid growth of secondary cities have become common enough in Latin America to indicate the operation of a broader set of determinants. These changes are apparent in countries at different levels of development and with different political systems and thus cannot be attributed exclusively to idiosyncratic domestic factors. A common explanation found in the recent literature is that big city growth is slowing down thanks to rapid declines in fertility throughout the region. This exclusively demographic explanation is not satisfactory, however, because changes in fertility behavior are much too recent to make an impact on established migration flows and because urban primacy can expand even in the absence of population growth.14 A more likely explanation lies in changes in productive structures following the demise of import substitution industrialization (ISI). As is well known, ISI industries located, for the most part, in the larger cities thus reinforcing patterns of urban primacy (Roberts, 1976; Eckstein, 1977: Ch. 1). The shift toward an export-oriented model during the late 1970s and 1980s has been accompanied by the growth of industries which -- like commercial agriculture, forestry, mining, and product assembly -- are not located in the large cities. The proliferation of export-processing zones in several countries adds to the trend because these industrial enclaves are generally located away from national capitals. Although still a hypothesis, the notion that the shift toward an export-orientation partially underlies changes in patterns of urbanization receives support from several sources. In Uruguay, the most rapid urban growth during the last intercensal period took place in cities which, like Bella Uni¢n and Artigas, are at the center of new agricultural export zones or, like Maldonado and Punta del Este, are closely linked with international tourist services (Lombardi and Altezor, 1987). In Chile, the expansion of fruit production, forestry, and fishing following the application of governmental export incentives has led to the rapid growth of several mid-size cities as well as to the emergence of new ones (Raczynski, 1986). To the extent that similar trends hold elsewhere, they would suggest that changing conditions in the world economy have affected patterns of urbanization through promotion of new export industries which encouraged, in turn, a partial shift in the direction of populations flows. A second trend which cuts across national settings is the rise of open unemployment during the 1980s. The main theoretical implication of this trend is the negation of past notions about the impossibility of mass unemployment in Third World cities and the countercyclical effect of the informal sector. While, as noted above, question-wording and counting procedures may affect national tallies, the indisputable fact is that there was in recent years a rise in the number of city dwellers deprived of any income-earning opportunities. Linkages between changing external conditions and domestic events are more transparent in this instance because the rise of unemployment can be traced directly to policies aimed at coping with foreign indebtness. Among recent urban developments, none reflects more clearly the continuing subordinate insertion of Latin America in the world economy than the continent-wide rise in unemployment. Neither the slowdown of urban primacy nor record levels of unemployment can be regarded as permanent or irreversible. A new period of rapid economic growth may return things to the status quo ante. Yet, the policy of export-promotion and its apparent centrifugal effects may also be more than a conjunctural development in a number of countries. To the extent that such trends persist, an unexpected outcome of the crisis would be a more balanced urban system than that associated with the era of import-substitution. Along with these trends, however, there are others which contradict the impression of uniform external determination. In cities like Bogot  and Montevideo, the informal sector did play a partially countercyclical role, less through autonomous growth than through employment transfers from formal industry. In Santiago, neo-conservative planners presided over the demise of most Chilean industry which could not compete unprotected with imports. Many industrial firms in Chile did not have the option to adjust through informalization because they were forced out of business by the removal of tariff barriers. In addition, the wide availability of cheap imported goods -- from clothing and footwear to food products -- may have discouraged their production by local micro- enterprises (Foxley, 1983; Lagos and Tokman, 1983; Raczynski, 1987). The experience of the crisis was thus lived in a different way by the urban working-class, depending on the policies adopted by national states. These experiences ranged from stagnant wages and widespread informalization to the virtual elimination of income- earning opportunities in either sector of the urban economy. Although unemployment and urban poverty were present everywhere, the cases described above may be arranged along a continuum with Santiago's population - - subject to the most rigorous application of free market ideology -- in the least enviable place. Another area of systematic variation is in the observed pattern of polarization within cities. Everywhere the dominant tendency is for upper and lower-income groups to live apart, but recent years have witnessed several partial reversals of this trend. Impoverished middle-classes in search of affordable housing and the desperately poor in search of some form of employment have given rise to new intra-urban spatial arrangements. For the poor, the occupation of spaces close to the urban center offer opportunities unavailable elsewhere and is hence, highly valued (Benton, 1986; Portes, 1978; Leeds, 1969). Well-to-do groups tend to take, however, a different stance. Their view is poignantly expressed by a well-known Peruvian novel published at the height of the crisis: In recent years, I've become accustomed to see next to vagabond dogs, vagabond children, vagabond old men, vagabond women. The spectacle of misery, in years past exclusive of the barriadas, later of the Center, is now of the entire city, including those districts residential and privileged. If one lives in Lima, one has to become accustomed to misery and dirt, or grow mad, or kill oneself (Vargas Llosa, 1984: 8). The distaste of the upper classes for close contact with the "spectacle of misery" probably insures that new forms of polarization will emerge in the future, with wealthy groups moving to ever more remote locations. In one case -- that of Santiago -- this effort is not necessary because the military authorities have taken steps to prevent any residential mix and reinforced, on the contrary, the pattern of class polarization. In this instance, it is lower- income groups who have had to move away in order to comply with the regime's views about urban spatial order. Such variations serve to highlight again the significance of internal forces, specifically state policies, as they interact with external constraints to produce different outcomes. The evolution of urban social movements, a topic as important as those discussed above, has accompanied and reflected this diversity. The general trend has been toward gradual weakening of traditional organized movements, such as trade unions, and the emergence of what Latin American scholars have dubbed the "new" social movements -- youth, women, residential associations, Church- sponsored "grassroots" communities, and the like (Cardoso, 1983; Jelin, 1985; Filgueira, 1985). The goals and strategies of such movements vary significantly, however. Where sufficient political space exist, most movements orient themselves toward traditional demand-making through established parties or in direct dialogue with the state. Popular organizations in Bogot  and in Montevideo after the return to an elected government generally fit this pattern. When the state becomes a reluctant interlocutor, popular movements either spearhead the militant opposition or withdraw into themselves. In Santiago, the most extreme case of political closure among those studied, organized demand-making was replaced at the height of the crisis by an increasingly self-reliant orientation among popular groups. In 1984, a survey of the Santiago metropolitan area identified over two hundred self-created artisanal cooperatives producing clothes and other goods for direct consumption and outside sale. Other instances included the "buying together" (comprando juntos) cooperatives, housing committees, debt committees, health groups, urban crop-raising collectives, and "communal pot" (ollas comunes) cooperatives. In total, close to a thousand such organizations grouping sizable proportions of the population of Santiago's poblaciones. Unemployed men, their wives, and children find in these cooperative ventures both a means of survival and a space for sociability and mutual support (Hardy, 1985; Shkolnik, 1986; Rodriguez, 1987). Some authors have seen the growth of these activities as a blueprint for national economic organization after the demise of the military regime. Although these expectations appear premature, recent developments in Santiago's peripheral settlements represent a notable departure from the measured demand-making of the past and attest to the ability of the urban poor to find novel solutions in the face of harsh outside conditions. The literature on Latin American urbanization prior to the 1980s gave us a fairly coherent portrait of a process where the relentless growth of primacy, increasing class polarization within cities, low unemployment but high underemployment, and institutionalized demand-making by lower-class groups were central features. In this paper, I have not attempted to document these baseline trends, but have relied instead on past studies as a point of reference to examine contemporary events. It is too soon to tell whether the observed developments represent a "blip" in a long-term trend or whether they are here to stay. Record levels of unemployment and enforced self- reliance by the urban poor will probably give way to more familiar patterns in the future. On the other hand, the slowing down of primacy and the informalization of much of the productive and trade apparatus may be more resilient features. If events during the years of the crisis rendered past descriptions of Latin American urbanization partially obsolete, we must still await the verdict of future evidence to know in what direction the process has actually been taken. Footnotes 1. This paper summarizes results of a collaborative project conducted during 1987-88 with the support of a research grant from the Heinz Endowment. The other participants in the project were William Cartier and Gabriel Murillo of the University of the Andes in Bogot ; Mario Lombardi and Danilo Veiga of CIESU in Montevideo; and Dagmar Raczynski of CIEPLAN in Santiago de Chile. Extensive reports prepared by these authors on their respective cities are the basis of this paper. They were presented originally at a seminar held at Florida International University. I acknowledge gratefully the participation in the project of each of these colleagues and the hospitality offered by the Center of Latin American and Caribbean Studies of FIU to our joint effort. I acknowledge gratefully their participation in the project as well as their comments on an earlier version of this article. I also thank Bryan R. Roberts, Stephen Bunker, A. Douglas Kincaid, Akihiro Koido, and Richard Tardanico for their valuable comments on an earlier version. Their collective expertise, as well as that of the original project participants, saved me from making many grievous errors. Finally, thanks are due to the editor of this journal and to anonymous referees for their extensive comments. All are exempted from any responsibility for the contents herein. 2. The comparative approach based on maximizing differences is only one of the possibilities discussed in the relevant literature. For our purposes, it is preferable to other alternatives. On the logic of comparative designs see Przeworski and Teune (1970); Lijphart (1975); and Ragin and Zaret (1983). 3. The data available for this analysis are not ideal. Countries differ in the timing and quality of their censuses, as well as in the definition of "urban" and "metropolitan." In this situation, the data presented in this section must be regarded as an approximation to current trends on the basis of the most recently published information. These estimates rely primarily on series from the United Nations' Demographic Yearbook, supplemented by other sources. The year 1970 is used as the base because data are available from a number of sources which facilitated cross-checks. 4. It is unlikely that vegetative increase alone has produced the sudden acceleration of growth in smaller cities. A more probable cause is the re-channelling of migrant flows previously directed exclusively toward the largest urban agglomerations. 5. In this section, "class" is used loosely to denote basic differences in socio-economic levels within the urban population. Such gross classification -- amounting essentially to differences between the well- to-do, middle-income groups, and the poor -- is made necessary by the impossibility of tracing reliably the places of residence of better-defined class categories. Quality and location of housing is certainly an important aspect of consumption rather than production. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that those atop the class structure and deriving the greatest benefits from it will be found in the most desirable urban locations while, at the other extreme, lowest-paid members of the proletariat will be forced to cluster in the most precarious areas. On the topic of urban class structures, see Portes (1985). 6. A composite map of Bogot  housing levels, omitted here because of space limitations is available from the author upon request. 7. A map of residential characteristics and growth of the Department of Montevideo, omitted here, is available upon request. 8. In one instance, an old comuna -- ¥u¤oa -- was divided in order to separate its middle- and upper- income areas from the poblaciones of the Pe¤alolen hill sector. The latter became a separate municipality. 9. A reader commented on the fact that spatial patterns cannot be equated with actual interaction between members of different classes. It is true that groups who live together may remain socially apart and that, conversely, distant individuals may seek each other's company. In this section, I make no assumptions about the specific character of the relationship between spatial location and social interaction, a subject which would require data beyond our present reach. It is clear, however, that spatial proximity promotes at least minimal mutual awareness. The occupation of public spaces by people from different social classes gives to urban society a very different character than when the same spaces are reserved exclusively for those within a narrow band of socio-economic positions. In particular, spatial proximity prevents the privileged from ignoring or affecting to ignore the existence of those at the other end of the class structure, something accomplished with remarkable ease when spatial segregation prevails. On this topic, see Hardoy (1972a) and Walton (1976). 10. Data omitted here indicate that unemployment is most common among secondary workers, such as spouses and dependent children but, as it climbs into double- digits, it also affects primary workers. This kind of unemployment should not be understood as similar to that endured by workers in the advanced countries since, unlike the latter, Latin American workers have little or no recourse to government relief. Ethnographic evidence suggests that, in the absence of remunerative work, former workers engage in various forms of subsistence activities in order to support their households' collective survival strategies. See Roberts (1988); Hardy (1985); and Fortuna and Prates (1988). 11. The economic re-activation program of the current Uruguayan administration has brought positive results, including higher aggregate growth rates, higher earnings, and recent declines in unemployment. There are few signs, however, of a return to the model of large, fully-unionized plants dominant in the past (Fortuna and Prates, 1988; Bayce, 1985). 12. A representative survey of five low-income settlements of Santiago in 1986 found that informal workers represented up to 45 percent of the working-age population and exceeded the number of the regularly- employed. Street vendors, domestic servants, odd jobbers, and casual service personnel comprised the vast majority of the informally employed (Shkolnick, 1986). 13. The average caloric deficit among the poorest fifth was estimated at about 25 percent of the minimum daily norms of the World Health Organization circa 1980. 14. River Plate capitals -- Buenos Aires and Montevideo -- provide examples of large cities which continued to grow after the fertility of the respective national populations approached replacement levels (Hardoy, 1972b; Klaczko and Rial, 1981). 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