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All theories of society and history must operate with some conception of “human nature for they are theories which seek to explain what happens in all societies and what determines the way people behave. It is sometimes said that Marxists do not believe in human nature but this is only true in the sense that we reject any conception of a static or unchanging “human nature," for we know that people's ideas, behavior and institutions are continually changing — that human nature can be found in many different forms. But the question still needs to be posed: what is it about men and their society which makes this change both possible and necessary?
It is the fact that human beings have to produce all the things which
they need in order to survive: they cannot simply “live off
nature in the way animals do. The animal, as Engels notes,
merely uses his environment and brings about changes in it simply
by his presence; man by his changes makes it serve his ends,
masters it. This is the final, essential distinction between man
and other
animals[1]
and it is only in terms of such a distinction that we can understand
man's historical “nature” as a being who produces.
But do not some animals, particularly the higher primates like apes
and chimpanzees, use their hands to build nests, grasp sticks and
even hurl stones at their enemies? The truth is that human beings,
even at the most primitive technical stage of their development, can
accomplish something which no ape has ever been seen to do and that is
to make tools with which to produce and to use their tools to alter
the world around them in a conscious and deliberate way. Mankind,
Engels was to say,
must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it
pursue politics, science, art, religion,
etc.;[2]
a fundamental condition of all history, which, today, as thousands
of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order
to sustain human
life. [3]
(a) because the activity of production itself brings people into
direct and continuing contact with the forces of nature (or the
world of matter); and
(b) because production is necessary to human survival whether
people are aware of this fact or not. Hence Marx often refers to
production as a “material” process which people enter
into “independent of their
will."[4]
With the development of classes in society so that a privileged
few do the “thinking” and an exploited majority have
to create the wealth, the materialist basis to human existence is
obscured by the philosophers and priests, etc. rather in the way
that many white people in South Africa don't think very much about
the importance of production and what it involves because they
have black servants and employees who do the real work for them!
Nevertheless material production is the most important fact of
human life and it explains why
(c) men can only be understood as individuals who survive in a
society. Production is essentially a collective activity in which
people have to work together so that when we speak about social
production, we necessarily refer to the relationships which
people enter into when they produce. Even the “Robinson
Crusoes” and the hermits of the world can only live in
isolation because they have first acquired the ability to think,
speak and produce by working in society.
and this need to produce is described by Marx and Engels as
But why should this approach to history be called
“materialist” in character? It is materialist
But in order to explain how the nature of men as social
producers alters the way they act in society, we need to look more
closely at the two aspects which constitute the production process:
| [1] | Dialectics of Nature, (Moscow, 1964), p.182. |
| [2] | “Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx”, Selected Works in one vol., (Moscow/London. 1968), p.435. |
| [3] | “The German Ideology”, Collected Works 5, (Moscow/London, 1976), p.42. |
| [4] | Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, (Moscow/London, 1971), p.20. |